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does the standard of good faith expose the employer to frivolous law
suits whenever an employee is discharged. If the court had adopted
a standard of good cause, the employee would only have to allege
and prove an involuntary termination of the employment contract
and the burden would immediately shift to the employer to justify
the termination. The employer's failui.e to meet this burden would
result in victory for the employee. Such a standard would certainly
create a greater possibility of frivolous law suits. However, under
the standard of good faith adopted by the court, the burden is on the
employee to prove not only involuntary termination but also bad
faith motivation. Faced with an inability to meet such a burden, it
is likely that most employees will be deterred from maintaining
frivolous suits against the employer. In addition, such frivolous suits
could be disposed of without difficulty by a motion to dismiss.
Historically, the employment at will relationship has been heav-
ily one sided; accommodating only the interests of the employer
although the employee also has important interests at stake in the
relationship. Accordingly, the New Hampshire decision in Beebe
Rubber must be applauded as an attempt to accommodate the
interests of both the employer and the employee in the employment
at will relationship, without unduly burdening or seriously jeopar-
dizing the traditional interests of the employer in running his busi-
ness as he believes is best. It is strongly urged that the courts of
other states follow the New Hampshire decision and incorporate this
development into the common law. 65
ALAN S. POLACKWICH
Administrative Law—Freedom of Information Act—Personal In-
formation Exempted from Disclosure—Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v.
IRS. 1 ----Wine Hobby USA, Inc. (Wine Hobby), a Pennsylvania cor-
poration engaged in the sale and distribution of winemaking equip-
ment, sought from the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms (the Bureau) a list containing the names and addresses
of all persons in the Bureau's Mid-Atlantic Region who had regis-
tered with the Bureau to produce wine for family consumotion. 2
65
 No other jurisdiction has been squarely presented with the same issue as was pre-
sented in this case. However, in the case of Geary v. United States Steel Corp., — Pa. —, 319
A.2d 174 (1974), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to allow a cause of action in tort
where a salesman, employed at will, was discharged for questioning the safeness of a product
about to be marketed by his employer. 319 A.2d at 178. Citing Monge v, Beebe Rubber Co.,
justice Roberts stated in a dissenting opinion: "This court should, in my view, fulfill its societal
role and its responsibility to the public interest by recognizing a cause of action for wrongful
discharge where the dismissal offends public policy." Id. at 185 (dissenting opinion).
1 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974).
2 Id. at 134. All persons who produce wine are subject to certain tax, bonding and
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Wine Hobby's sole interest in obtaining this list was its planned use
of the names and addresses in an advertising campaign in which
various announcements regarding equipment and supplies sold by
Wine Hobby would be forwarded to the registrants. 3
Upon the Bureau's refusal to disclose the requested names and
addresses, Wine Hobby brought suit under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA or the Act)4 requesting that the court order the
permit requirements. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5041(a), (d), 5043(a), (b) (1970); 27 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1)
(1970). A "duly registered head of any family," however, who produces "for family use and
not for sale an amount of wine not exceeding 200 gallons per annum" is exempted from these
requirements. 26 U.S.C. § 5042(a)(2) (1970). Such a person may become "duly registered" by
filing a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Form 1541. 26 C.F.R. §§ 240.540-43
(1974). If the Bureau approves the form, it is stamped, a copy is returned to the registrant and
the other copy is kept on file with the Bureau. 502 F.2d at 134.
3 502 F.2d at 134.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), formerly ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946). The Act provides that
each agency shall publish in the Federal Register: (1) a description of its central and field
organization; (2) a description of its procedures, both formal and informal; (3) its rules of
procedure; (4) descriptions of the agency's forms and where they can be obtained; (5) substan-
tive rules and (6) statements of general policy. Each agency must also, in accordance with its
published rules, make available for public inspection and copying: (1) final opinions; (2)
statements of policy and interpretations which have not been published in the Federal
Register; (3) staff manuals; and (4) instructions which might affect the public. More pertinent
to the controversy in Wine Hobby however, is 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970) which provides,
inter alio:
[E]ach agency, on request for identifiable records made in accordance with published
rules stating the time, place, fees to the extent authorized by statute, and procedure
to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person. On
complaint, the district court of the United States . . . has jurisdiction to enjoin the
agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of agency
records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court shall
determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.
81 Stat. 55 (1967).
The Act sets out nine specific exemptions to the general rule of disclosure. It does not
apply to matters which are:
(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
the national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the
extent available by law to a•party other than an agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation
or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concern-
ing wells.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970).
The last section of the Act states that "[dills section does not authorize withholding of
information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in
this section." 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970).
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Bureau to disclose this information. The Bureau contended that
Wine Hobby was not entitled to the information sought, since such
information was specifically exempted from the requirement of dis-
closure under subsection (b)(6) 5 [hereinafter referred to as exemption
61. Exemption 6 excludes from the requirement of disclosure "per-
sonnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of. personal priva-
cy."6
 Alternatively, the Bureau argued that, even if the names and
addresses did not fall within the scope of exemption 6, the court
could, in the exercise of its equitable discretion, decline to order
disclosure.?
Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ordered
disclosure of the requested information to Wine Hobby. 8 In a some-
what ambiguous opinion, the court held that the list of names and
addresses could not be withheld under the authority of exemption 6,
and that, since the information sought was not specifically exempted
by the Act, the district court did not have discretionary power to
refuse to order disclosure. 9
In reversing this decision, 10 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit HELD: the list of names and addresses sought
by Wine Hobby was a "file" similar to the medical and personnel
files specifically referred to in exemption 6;" and that the disclosure
of such information would result in a "clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy." 12 In making the latter determination, the court
stated that it was required to balance the public interest which
would be served by disclosure against the severity of the harm
-which disclosure would cause the individual." Since Wine Hobby's
interest was purely economic, the court reasoned that no public
interest would be served by disclosure and, therefore, concluded
that disclosure was not mandated by the Act." As a result of this
disposition, the court believed it unnecessary to decide whether a
district court possesses discretion to decline to order disclosure
where the material requested is not specifically exempted by the
Act."
The significance of Wine Hobby lies in the interpretation which
' 502 F.2d at 1.34.
6
 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (19
7 502 F.2d at 134.
8 Wine Hobby, USA, Inc.
F. Supp. 231, 237 (E.D. Pa.
9
 Id. at 236.
1 ° It should be noted that
Circuit. It filed no brief and it
" Id. at 135.
12 Id. at 137.
'' Id. at 136.
14 Id. at 137.
'' Id. at 137-38.
70).
Wine Hobby did not participate in the appeal to the Third
did not participate in oral argument. 502 F.2d at 134 n.7.
v. United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 363
1973).
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the court gave to exemption 6 in order to reach its apparent goal of
preventing the commercial exploitation of the FOIA. This note will
focus upon an examination of that interpretation. Specifically, the
holding in Wine Hobby that a list of names and addresses is a file
similar to a medical or personnel file will be analyzed in order to
determine whether such a construction can be supported in light of
both the language and the legislative history of exemption 6. The
balancing concept used by the court in its determination of whether
disclosure was warranted will then be discussed. The purpose of the
Act, and the language which Congress chose to accomplish that
purpose will be cited in support of this balancing test. Finally, the
discretion allowed the courts to refuse disclosure when the informa-
tion sought is not specifically exempted will be considered. It will be
suggested that, if correctly interpreted, the FOIA requires govern-
mental agencies to release from their files lists of names and addres-
ses to any commercial enterprise which requests them, even though
the firm's sole intention is to use these lists in a campaign of direct
mail advertising. While this construction of the FOIA would appear
to be more consistent with the express statutory language, it will be
submitted that the resulting disclosure would be contrary to the
purpose of the FOIA, and that the Act should therefore be amended
to preclude such a result.
The FOIA was enacted to assure the free flow of governmental
information "necessary to an informed electorate."" It was not,
however, the first attempt of Congress to enact such a statute. The
FOIA amended section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 17 This amendment, in effect, replaced a "withholding stat-
ute" with a disclosure statute."' The failure of the APA to provide
for adequate access to governmental information resulted from the
two qualifications which it placed upon disclosure: material could be
withheld either "for good cause,"" or where the party seeking the
disclosure was not "properly and directly concerned." 20 These
somewhat nebulous standards gave rise to a situation in which the
APA could be cited as authority for the withholding of virtually any
data, thereby allowing governmental agencies to exercise "a sort of
personal ownership" over information in their possession. 2 ' The
FOIA was intended to remedy this situation22 by mandating liberal
disclosure, judicially enforceable upon complaint by the aggrieved
party, 23 and by replacing the vague "for good cause" exemption
16 H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1967) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep.].
17 Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238.
18 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
19 Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238.
20 Id.
21 See H.R. Rep., supra note 16, at 2,
22 S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 5-6 (1967) [hereinafter cited as S. Rep.];
H.R. Rep., supra note 16, at 1-2, 12.
27 5 U.S.C. § 552(a}(3) (1970). See note 4 supra.
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with nine specific exemptions. 24 Moreover, the necessity that the
requesting party be "properly and directly concerned" was
abolished—the new act providing for disclosure to "any person." 25
The goal of providing public access to governmental records,
however, is in many instances inconsistent with another important
interest: that of protecting the personal privacy of each individual
from unnecessary invasion. Two provisions of the FOIA, exemption
6 and subsection (a)(2), embody the congressional resolution of this
conflict. 26
 Exemption 6, the provision which is the primary focus of
this note, has spawned vastly differing interpretations."
Exemption 6 provides that the general rule of required disclo-
sure does not apply to "personnel and medical files and similar files
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy." 28 For information to fall within the
scope of this exemption, then, it must possess two distinct charac-
teristics: first, it must be a medical file, a personnel file or a similar
file; second, its disclosure must constitute "a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy." Neither, characteristic, by itself, is
sufficient to avoid the requirement of disclosure. Both must exist
together. 29
 Moreover, whether certain information is such a file
must be determined independently of whether its disclOsure would
compromise an individual's privacy. The definition of the term "file"
is limited only by the words "personnel," "medical," and "similar."
While a finding that disclosure would result in an invasion of
privacy may, in some instances, be relevant to the determination of
what is a "similar" file, the major relevance of this consideration is
in the determination of whether the information may be
withheld—after the finding has already been made that the material
sought is a personnel file, a medical file, or a similar file. The
language of the exemption cannot be read faithfully in any other
manner." Consequently, if the material sought is not a personnel
file, a medical file, or a similar file, then regardless of its content, it
is not within the pale of exemption 6.
The court in Wine Hobby held that a list of names and addres-
24 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970). See note 4 supra.
25 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970),
26 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(2), 552(6)(6) (1970). Subsection (a)(2) provides:
To the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, an agency may delete identifying details when it makes available or
publishes an opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual of instruc-
tion. However, in each case the justification for the deletion shall be explained fully
in writing.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1970).
27 See text at notes 31-95 infra.
38
 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970).
29
 Ditlow v. Shultz, 379 F. Supp. 326, 329 (D.D.C. 1974). See Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d
843, 846 (4th Cir. 1973); Getman v, NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
3*
 The Act refers to certain files, "the disclosure of which would constitute a dearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970) (emphasis added).
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ses was a "similar file" within the meaning of exemption 6. 31 In
arriving at this conclusion, however, the court paid little heed to the
Act's express language, stating:
A broad interpretation of the statutory term to include
names and addresses is necessary to avoid a denial of
statutory protection in a case where release of requested
materials would result in a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy. Since the thrust of the exemption is to
avoid unwarranted invasions of privacy, the term "file"
should not be given an interpretation that would often
preclude inquiry into this more crucial question. 32
Through this approach, the court disregarded the well-settled rule
that "[a] broad construction of the exemptions [is] contrary to the
express language of the Act."" This rule would appear to be man-
dated by the language of the FOIA's last subsection, which states
that the Act "does not authorize withholding of information . . .
except as specifically stated in this section."34
In its interpretation of the statutory provisions, the court relied
upon the second criterion—whether disclosure would constitute .a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy—to define the
first—personnel and medical files and similar files. 35 This approach
rendered the qualifying phrase "similar files" meaningless. Under
the Wine Hobby formulation, all data, the disclosure of which is
found to constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual's
privacy, must be construed as a file similar to a medical or personnel
file. In essence, the court's interpretation would operate to exclude
the production of "all matter the disclosure of which would consti-
tute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." This in-
terpretation cannot be supported by either the language or the
legislative history of the Act. 36
Exemption 6 refers specifically to "personnel and medical files
and similar files . . . ." In construing this phrase to include a list of
names and addresses, the court disregarded the accepted principle of
31 502 F.2d at 135.
32 Id.
33 Weliford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 25 (4th Cir. 1971). Accord, Rose v. Department of
Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424
F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
34 5 U.S.C.	 552(c) (1970) (emphasis added).
33 See 502 F.2d at 135.
36 Several bills had been submitted in the House, some of which used the phrase "similar
files," and some of which used the phrase "similar matters." Compare H.R. 5237, 5406, 5520,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) ("similar matters") with H.R. 12682, 14735, 89th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1966) ("similar files"). The House would appear to have specifically rejected the use of the
phrase "similar matters" in its adoption of the FOIA which used, instead, the phrase "similar
files." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970).
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ejusdem generis which provides that when "general words follow an
enumeration of . . things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest
extent, but are to be held as applying only to . . . things of the same
general kind or class as those specifically mentioned."37 Assuming
that a list of names and addresses is a "file" as that word is generally
understood, surely it cannot be maintained that such a file is similar
in nature to a personnel or medical file. A name and address give
little personal information about the individual. The opposite is true
of medical and personnel records, and it was the disclosure of such
personal information which Congress sought to avoid. In defining
the phrase, "similar files," the Senate Report refers specifically to
files kept by the Selective Service, the Veterans' Administration, and
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Such agencies,
the report states, are those to which "persons are required to submit
vast amounts of personal data . . . ."38 The House Report referred
to the files of those agencies and of the Bureau of Prisons o noting
that they contained "intimate details . . the disclosure of which
might harm the individual."39 It seems clear, therefore, that a list of
names and addresses is not the type of file to which the Act or the
congressional reports make reference.
Further support is lent to this interpretation by the decision in
Robles v. EPA," where the Fourth Circuit, unlike the court in
Wine Hobby, applied the rule of ejusdem generis and remained
faithful to the congressional reports. The court in Robles noted
that:
The term "similar" was used, it seems, to indicate that,
while the exemption was not limited to strictly medical or
personnel files, the files covered in this third category must
have the same characteristics of-confidentiality that ordi-
narily attach to information in medical or personnel files;
that is, to such extent as they contain " 'intimate details' of
a 'highly personal' nature", they are within the umbrella of
the exemption.'"
This construction of exemption 6 would appear to require the dis-
closure of the list sought by Wine Hobby. While such a result would
seem to be contrary to the purpose of the FOIA, since the Act's goal
was merely to promote the education of the electorate, 42 and not to
assist a private enterprise in its search for profit, it would appear
that the Robles construction is the only one which the language of
37
 Black's Law Dictionary 608 (revised 4th ed. 1968) (citations omitted).
" S. Rep., supra note 22, at 9.
39 H.R. Rep., supra note 16, at 11.
40 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
4 ' Id. at 845.
42 See text at notes 16-26 supra.
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exemption 6 will permit. The choice of the phrase "similar files"
may have been unfortunate; 43 however it was not accidental," and
it cannot be ignored.
Had the court in Wine Hobby ,adopted this construction, it
would have been dispositive of the case and disclosure would have
been ordered unless the court found that disclosure could be denied
upon equitable principles.'" Exemption 6 is inapplicable to informa-
tion which is not in the nature of a medical file or a personnel file."
All other issues are immaterial, and disclosure would have been
required. Since the court held that the information sought by Wine
Hobby was a "similar file" within the meaning of the exemption, it
proceeded to examine whether its disclosure would result in a
"dearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 47
In determining whether the disclosure of the requested names
and addresses would "constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy," the court in Wine Hobby noted that, initially, it
was necessary to establish whether the disclosure would result in
any invasion of privacy. 48 Should an invasion be found, it would
then be necessary to "balance the seriousness of that invasion with
the purpose asserted for release."'" According to the Third Circuit,
if the benefits expected to accrue to the public from the disclosure
appeared greater than the probable harm to the individual, disclo-
sure would be ordered. Conversely, if the privacy interest protected
by withholding the material outweighed the public interest in dis-
closure, then disclosure of the information would not be required.
The court indicated that the use of this test was compelled by the
express statutory language. 5 ° Applying this formula to the facts of
Wine Hobby, the court concluded that disclosure would result in an
invasion of privacy. 5 ' Since the appellee's sole motive in requesting
43 Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev, 761, 797-98
(1967).
44 See note 36 supra.
45 See text at notes 88-95 infra.
46 See text at notes 28-30 supra,
47 For cases which hold that the requested material is a "similar file" within the meaning
of exemption 6, see Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d
73, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (materials contained in an investigation of governmental housing
discrimination in Florida); Rose v, Department of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 266 (2d Cir. 1974)
(case summaries of Honor and Ethic Code adjudications at Air Force Academy); Ditlow v.
Shultz, 379 F. Supp. 326, 329 (D.D.C. 1974) {customs declarations).
For cases which have dealt with the disclosure of names and addresses, but which did
not specifically decide whether such information came within the meaning of the term "similar
file," see Secretary of Labor v. Farino, 490 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1973); Getman v. NLRB, 450
F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Tuchinsky v. Selective Serv. Sys., 418 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1969);
Ditlow v. Shultz, 379 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1974). The district court in Wine Hobby also
avoided this issue. See Wine Hobby, USA, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms,
363 F. Supp. 231 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
4" 502 F.2d at 136.
49 Id ,
1 ° Id.
S ' Id. The court stated:
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the information was of a pecuniary nature, the court found that
disclosure would be clearly unwarranted. 52
This balancing test, however, is not universally accepted. 53
Opponents argue that the change from the APA requirement that
persons seeking disclosure be "properly and directly concerned," 54 to
the FOIA provision requiring disclosure to "any person," 55 demon-
strates that balancing is the very abuse which the Congress sought
to eliminate. 56
 As a result of using the balancing test, disclosure may
remain dependent upon the identity of the party who is seeking it.
While a commercial enterprise might not be entitled to the names
and addresses sought by Wine Hobby, it is probable that their
disclosure would be ordered on behalf of a professor of medicine
studying alcoholic consumption. This apparent "double standard"
can be seen clearly by comparing the result in Wine Hobby with that
in Getman v. NLRB. 57 In Getman, two professors of labor law
studying union election tactics sought from the NLRB the names
and addresses of employees in thirty-five businesses where represen-
tation elections were to be held. 58 In opposing the request, the
NLRB argued that such information was protected from disclosure
by exemption 6." The District of Columbia Circuit utilized the
balancing test6° and ordered disclosure," noting that "the loss of
privacy resulting from this particular disclosure should be charac-
terized as relatively minor," 62 that the appellees were "highly
qualified specialists in labor law,"63 and that the particular study in
which they were engaged had "been reviewed and supported by
virtually every major scholar in the labor law field." 64 Thus, both
the Getman and the Wine Hobby courts employed the balancing test
[T]here are few things which pertain to an individual in which his privacy has
traditionally been more respected than his home., .. Disclosure ... would involve a
release of each registrant's home address, . . . information concerning personal
activities within the home, namely winemaking . .. [and] information concerning
the family status of the registrant, including the fact that he is not living alone and
that he exercises family control or responsibility in the household.
Id. at 137.
52 Id. at 137.
53
 See Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1973); K. Davis, Administrative
Law § 3A.4, at 121 (Supp. 1970); Note, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 527 (1972).
54
 Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238.
55 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
56
 Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973); K. Davis, supra note 53, at § 3A.4,
at 120; Note, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 527, 529 (1972).
57
 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir, 1971).
58 Id. at 671. The professors sought to interview selected employees before and after
these elections. Id.
59 Id. at 672.
60 Id. at 674-77.
61 Id. at 680.
62
 Id. at 675.
63
 Id. at 676.
64 Id.
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in determining whether disclosure of names and addresses was
warranted under exemption 6. The courts reached opposite conclu-
sions, however, since in Getman the requesting parties were
academically motivated professors, while in Wine Hobby, the plain-
tiff was a business motivated by the desire for profit.
In Robles u. EPA, 65
 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit criticized this "double standard" and rejected appli-
cation of the balancing test. In that case the appellants sought the
results of an EPA survey of approximately 15,000 structures which
had been built upon fill containing radioactive matter. 66 The EPA
contended that the information in the survey was a "similar file"
within the meaning of exemption 6, 67
 and, in advocating use of the
balancing test, argued that disclosure was not warranted since the
public interest in the results of the survey was negligible. 68 The
court rejected this contention and stated that it "misconceives the
plain intent of the Act."69 According to, the court, the change in the
FOIA to "any person" demonstrated "beyond argument that dis-
closure was never meant to depend upon the interest or lack of
interest of the party seeking disclosure.""
As the cases show, however, it is clearly not "beyond argu-
ment" that such an interest can be taken into account." In Getman
v. NLRB, 72 the District of Columbia Circuit agreed with Robles,
stating that "discretionary balancing of the competing interests [is]
necessarily inconsistent with the purpose of the Act ... ."73 Con-
tinuing, however, the court went on to state that leixemption (6),
by its explicit language, calls for such balancing and must therefore
be viewed as an exception to the general thrust of the Act."74
Support for this conclusion can be found in the Senate Report which
states that "[t]he phrase 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy' enunciates a policy that will involve a balancing of interests
between the protection of an individual's private affairs from un-
necessary public scrutiny, and the preservation of the public's right
to governmental information."" While the report also states that the
FOIA will increase access to governmental information by eliminat-
65
 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973), See text at notes 40-41 supra.
66
 Id, at 844. The opinion does not mention the purpose for which the information was
sought.
67
 Id. at 845.
68 Id. at 846-47.
69
 Id. at 847.
7 ° Id.
71
 See Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dept of Agriculture, 498' F.2d 73, 77
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Rose v. Department of Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 269-70 (2d Cir. 1974);
Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674-75 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ditlow'v. Shultz, 379 F. Supp.
326, 330-32 (D.D.C. 1974).
72
 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971). For the facts of this case, see text at notes 58-64 supra.
73 Id. at 674 n,10.
'74 Id.
75 S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1967) [hereinafter cited as S. Rep.].
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ing inquiry into the purpose for which disclosure is sought, 76 it adds
that "[t]here is, of course, a certain need for confidentiality in some
aspects of Government operations and these are protected
specifically; but outside of these limited areas, all citizens have a
right to know."" Consequently, only non-exempt material must be
disclosed to "any person." With respect to information covered by a
specific exemption, all persons do not have a right to know.
One commentary has suggested that the court or the agency
need only look to the gravity of the invasion of privacy, and can
disregard the countervailing interest in disclosure." It is the au-
thors' position that the references to balancing in the congressional
reports can be read to mean that Congress itself struck the balance,
"leaving the agency or court only application of that standard with-
out further balancing . . 1979 While the House Report might
support this position, 8 ° the Senate Report does not; 81 and because
the House Report was submitted after the Senate had already
passed its bill, the Senate Report is generally given preference over
the House Report as an indication of legislative intent. 82
It is submitted that the words "clearly unwarranted" imply that
decisions will be made in light of the totality of the circumstances,
thus requiring some type of balancing. Judgments which sift the
unwarranted invasions from the warranted must be made. It is
highly unlikely that Congress would have chosen this language had
it intended that only the extent of the invasion be considered with-
out inquiry into the purpose for which disclosure was sought.
Phrases such as "a serious" or "a severe invasion of personal pri-
vacy" would certainly have shown that intent much more clearly if
indeed that intent was meant to be expressed. 83 It appears that a
/8
 Id. at 5.
77
 Id. at 6.
78 Note, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 527, 535 n.48 (1972).
" Id.
8° The House Report states that "[t]he limitation of a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy' provides a proper balance between the protection of an individual's right of
privacy and the preservation of the public's right to Governmental information . . . ." H.R.
Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1967) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep.].
8 ' S. Rep., supra note 75, at 9. See text at note 75 supra.
63. E.g., Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 794 (6th Cir. 1972); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d
670, 673 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veterans'
Adm'n, 301 F. Supp. 796, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d
Cir. 1971); Benson v. General Servs. Adm'n, 289 F. Supp. 590, 595 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff'd
on other grounds, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969).
Professor Davis has written:
The content of the law must depend upon the intent of both Houses, not of just one.
In this instance, only the bill, not the House Committee's statements at variance
with the bill, reflects the intent of both Houses. Indeed, no one will ever know
whether the Senate committee or the Senate would have concurred in the restrictions
written into the House committee report.
Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761, 810 (1967).
83 The legislative history shows that the phrase "clearly unwarranted" was intentionally
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correct reading of exemption 6 reveals that Congress expressed its
intention that the invasion of privacy be serious by providing that
only "personnel and medical files and similar files" were subject to
the exemption. The second requirement of exemption 6—that the
disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy—was intended to give the agencies and the courts
guidance as to the circumstances under which those materials could
be withheld.
It should also be remembered that the FOIA is a disclosure
act." Where the production of certain information "necessary to an
informed electorate" 85 compromises the privacy of an individual, it,
is inconsistent with the clear intent of the Act to look merely at the
invasion of privacy, without also weighing the public's need for that
information. For these reasons, the treatment given to the language
in the latter part of exemption 6 by the court in Wine Hobby
appears to be more convincing, and better supported, than that
given by the court in Robles.
The result in Wine Hobby would appear to be correct in in-
stances where the information requested contained "intimate details
of a highly personal nature,"" since the public interest served by
one individual's pursuit of profit would not appear to outweigh the
interest of another individual in withholding personal matters from
the public. This is not the case presented in Wine Hobby, however,
since disclosure of the requested names and addresses would result
in only a minor invasion of personal privacy. The fact that one is
the head of a household and produces wine for family consumption
is not a fact which most people would actively strive to keep secret.
Since the persons involved are individuals who make wine in their
homes, it may reasonably be assumed that many would welcome,
and even desire, information concerning winemaking equipment
and supplies. 87 The disclosure of the requested data would not only
be advantageous to these particular persons, but the public at large
could also benefit through resulting increases in economic activity
and tax revenue. It is submitted, therefore, that all interests in
personal privacy do not necessarily outweigh all interests connected
with the pursuit of profit. Where the invasion of privacy is minor, as
in Wine Hobby, the scales could tip in favor of profit.
Since the Wine Hobby court held that the requested materials
could be withheld under the authority of exemption 6, any consider-
included by Congress. At the hearings on the bill, it was urged by several agency spokesmen
that either the word "clearly" or the entire phrase "clearly unwarranted" be deleted. These
words were included in the Act only after much deliberation by both Houses. Getman v.
NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
84
 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
"5
 H.R. Rep., supra note 80, at 12. See text at note 16 supra.
36
 Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 845 (4th Cir. 1973). See text at note 41 supra.
87
 See Wine Hobby, USA, Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 363 F. Supp.
231, 237 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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ation of whether the court would have been required to order
disclosure had the names and addresses not fallen within the specific
exemption was unnecessary. 88 The language of subsection (c) which
states that the Act does not authbrize the withholding of informa-
tion, "except as specifically stated in this section"89
 would seem to
settle this issue. However, it has been argued that the courts possess
equitable discretion to decline to order disclosure in such
circumstances. 9° Professor Davis argues that the district courts are
not required to enforce the FOIA," and cites in support of this
position subsection (a)(3) which provides: "On complaint, the district
court . has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding
agency records . . . ."92 It is his position that the court has jurisdic-
tion to enforce the FOIA, but that it is not required to do 50. 93
Furthermore, he argues that the word "enjoin" brings into play the
traditional principles of equity, and that "an equity court by its
intrinsic nature has a discretionary power to refuse to participate in
bringing about results that are inconsistent with sound equitable
practice."94
 Both of these viewpoints have been followed in the
courts of appeals," and it would appear that definitive Supreme
Court guidance on this question is warranted.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that Wine Hobby was wrongly decided. Al-
though the court was correct in holding that exemption 6 of the
FOIA calls for the balancing of various interests in determining
whether the requested disclosure is warranted, that concept had no
application to the particular facts which were before the court. For
ee 502 F.2d at 137-38. It is probable, however, that the court in Wine Hobby felt that no
such discretion was allowed—hence the need to rest its decision upon such a broad reading of
exemption 6, rather than upon accepted principles of equity.
89 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970).
9° See, e.g., General Serv. Adm'n v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969);
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veterans' Adm'n, 301 F. Supp. 796, 806
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
91 K. Davis, supra note 53, at § 3A.6, at 123.
92
 5 U.S.C.	 552(a)(3) (1970).
93
 K. Davis, supra note 53, at § 3A.6, at 123.
94
 Id. This argument finds support in the House Report: "The Court will have authority
whenever it considers such action equitable and appropriate to enjoin the agency from
withholding its records and to order the production of agency records improperly held." H.R.
Rep., supra note 80, at 9 (emphasis added). The report further states that "[t]he purpose of
this subsection is to make clear beyond doubt that all the materials of Government are to be
available to the public unless specifically exempt from disclosure by the provisions of subsec-
tion (e) [§ 552(b)] or limitations spelled out in earlier subsections." H. R, Rep., supra note 80,
at 11 (emphasis added).
95
 Compare Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d
787, 792 n.6 (6th Cir. 1972); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677-80 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(discretion not allowed) with Wu v. National Endowment for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030,
1034 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973); General Serv. Adm'n v. Benson, 415
F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969) (discretion allowed).
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material to come within the scope of that exemption, it first must be
in the nature of a medical file, a personnel file, or a similar file. It
does not appear that a list of names and addresses comes within
these terms. Moreover, even if such a list could be construed as a
"similar file," the balance which the court struck is arguably incor-
rect.
It is submitted that a faithful reading of the exemption clearly
reveals that Congress has provided no shield against the required
disclosure of names and addresses in cases such as this one. If this
analysis of exemption 6 is correct, then, in its present form, the
FOIA mandates the disclosure of these lists on demand and gov-
ernmental agencies are presently vulnerable to wholesale requests
for lists of names and addresses, even though the party seeking them
has the singular intention of using this information in commercial
mailing lists. 96 If these requests are made, the FOIA requires that
they be honored. Only Congress can remedy this situation by
amending the Act, and there are several bills presently being studied
by the House Committee on Government Operations which focus
upon this problem. 97 A narrowly drawn amendment prohibiting
only the disclosure of names and addresses which are sought solely
for commercial purposes would solve the type of problem presented
in Wine Hobby and would render unnecessary the type of strained
statutory construction used by that court to reach a result it felt to
be both equitable and in accord with the purpose of the
99 See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 680-81 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring).
97 H.R. 889, 1779, 2578, 3995, 5434, 6838-40, 8086, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R.
12558, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). H.R. 6840, supra, virtually identical to the other bills
listed, provides for the amendment of the FOIA by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection
(d) and by adding in its place a provision which prohibits any agency from disclosing the
names and addresses of: present or former employees of any agency, present or former
members of the armed forces, persons registered or required to file information with any
agency, or persons licensed by any agency. However, paragraphs (2) and (3) provide for three
exceptions to this rule:
(2) An agency may make available a list of names and addresses of persons referred
to in paragraph (1)-
(A) if the person to whom such list is made available certifies (in such manner
as the agency shall by regulation prescribe) that-
(i) such list will not be used for purposes of commercial or other solicita-
tion, and
(ii) such list will not be used for any purpose which is unlawful under any
State or Federal law, or
(B) if the list is made available by the agency as a necessary part of its statutory
functions or requirements (other than requirements imposed by this section).
(3) Any agency may make available a list, of names and addresses if specifically
authorized to do so by statute (other than this section).
Any person who were to use for purposes of commercial or other solicitation, a list obtained
under paragraph (2)(A), or who failed to remove from such a list the name of a person who
had been solicited and who had requested that his name be removed, would be subject to
imprisonment for not more than one year, a fine of not more than $10,000 or both. H.R. 6840,
supra.
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legislation. 98
 The enactment of such an amendment is, therefore,
recommended. *
BARRY LARMAN
Civil Procedure
—
Class Actions
—Notice Obligations of Representa-
tive Plaintiff—Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.'—In 1966, Morton
Eisen filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York on behalf of himself and all other persons who
had purchased or sold odd-lots 2 on the New York Stock Exchange
from May 1, 1962 through June 30, 1966. 3 In the complaint, two of
the Exchange's major odd-lot brokerage firms, Carlisle & Jacquelin
and DeCoppet & Doremus, were charged with monopolizing odd-lot
trading and charging excessive fees. 4 A third defendant, the New
York Stock Exchange, was charged with failing to regulate the fees
charged by the two firms. 5 Eisen's' individual claim included treble
damages for the amount of the overcharge and amounted to a total
of seventy dollars. 6 The claim for the class as a whole, which
55
 The bills cited in note 97 supra would appear to be unnecessarily broad. The proposed
amendments provide that an agency is merely permitted to make disclosure of names and
addresses after the necessary certification has been made; it is not required to do so. See bills
cited in note 97 supra. Such discretion could possibly result in the refusal of all requests for
names and addresses regardless of the purpose for which they were sought—for if there is any
lesson to be learned from the history of the FOIA, it is that where disclosure is discretionary,
there is likely to be no disclosure at all. See text at notes 16-25 supra. This problem cannot be
solved merely by making disclosure mandatory upon certification. Such a provision would
require disclosure in all instances, without regard to the resulting invasion of privacy suffered
by the individuals concerned. Some type of balancing, therefore, would appear to be required
in determining whether non-commercial requests for names and addresses should be granted.
It is also suggested that the provision which requires a certification that the list "will not
be used for purposes of commercial or. other solicitation	 ." is unduly restrictive. H.R.
6840, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
	
(2)(A)(i) (1973) (emphasis added). Courts and agencies might
construe such a provision as empowering an agency to refuse disclosure in instances where the
requesting party seeks merely to interview or otherwise question persons whose names appear
on the disclosed list. Such a restriction would make the execution of a study such as that
which was at issue in Getman totally dependent upon the whim of agency bureaucrats. See
text at notes 57-64 supra. This is the very situation which the FOIA was intented to prevent.
* As this article was going to press, Congress passed certain amendments to the FOIA
over President Ford's veto. This legislation is not relevant to the issues presented in Wine
Hobby.
' 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
2
 "Odd-lots" are shares traded in lots of less then a hundred. Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
3
 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. at 160.
The defendant firms were alleged to have violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970). 417 U.S. at 160.
5
 The Exchange was alleged to have violated §§ 6 and 19 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78s (1970). 94 U.S. at 160.
6
 417 U.S. at 161.
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